Abstract-Security is one of key factors which influence the development of mobile P2P systems. However, traditional security techniques cannot be applied directly to a mobile P2P network due to some of its characteristics such as heterogeneous nature of the peers, limited-range as well as unreliability of wireless links. In the paper we propose a distributed trust evaluation model, which helps the systems to operate normally with high probability. The model uses a polling protocol and seven metrics to real-time evaluate the reputation of mobile peers. The model exhibits three interesting features not seen in previous works. Firstly, it considers voting for peers from the perspectives of both trust and distrust. This appears to be the first attempt to incorporate distrust in the polling algorithm. Secondly, it credits/penalizes a peer according to its interaction behaviors, the size of interaction and the vote accuracy. This mechanism of credit and penalization is expected to deter dishonesty or misbehavior by the entities involved. Thirdly, it effectively solves the trust problem when no prior interaction history exists, an issue that has not been addressed in many models. In the end, the model is shown to be efficient and robust in the presence of attackers through simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the deployment of high bandwidth 3G (and expected deployment of 3.5G and 4G) cellular networks and wireless LANs, there is an increasing interest in wireless P2P networks. A wireless mobile network is a cooperative network where each node requires collaborating with each other to forward packets from a source to a destination. It is often termed an infrastructure-less, self-organized, or spontaneous network. In mobile P2P systems, each peer acts as both client and server to share its resources with other peers, and communicates with each other via unregulated, shortrange wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, or Ultra Wide Band (UWB) [9] . It is obvious that mobile P2P systems are different from the wired ones, since each object is able to move around and each has a limited radio range. Compared to a fixed peer-topeer system, the mobile network environment is more distributed, with wider participants and more autonomic than the fixed P2P system. However, traditional security techniques cannot be applied directly to the mobile P2P systems due to the limitations of the wireless medium, expensive bandwidth, and the limitations of the mobile devices due to small memory and limited computation power [1] . Therefore, computation-intensive techniques like public-key cryptography are not expected to be used in mobile P2P systems. Such a distinction is also beyond the ability of the conventional key management scheme because we cannot guarantee the secrecy of each peer's private key. In addition, mobile devices are susceptible to a variety of attacks for example, eavesdropping, denial of services, wormhole, and Sybil attack. Even a few malicious peers can easily spread deceitful data and make the systems be in confusion without great efforts. Therefore, some smart trust management schemes are needed to identify trustworthiness of mobile peers in order to distinguish between malicious peers and innocuous peers, and to strengthen reliable peers and weaken suspicious peers.
The idea of constructing a trust-based scheme is motivated from existing human societies in the world. Embedded in every social network is a web of trust; with a link representing the trustworthiness between two individuals. When faced with uncertainty, individuals seek the opinions of those they trust. The intent is to develop a similar trust management mechanism for P2P Systems, where peers maintain trust value for other peers. This trust value is used to evaluate the trustworthiness of other peers. This establishes a web of trust in the network, which is then used as an inherent aspect in predicting the future behavior of peers in the network. Because mobile P2P systems pose some unique challenges, not every current trust evaluation models [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] are applicable to mobile P2P systems properly. In the paper we propose a distributed trust evaluation model, which helps the systems to operate normally with high probability. The model uses a polling protocol and seven metrics to real-time evaluate the reputation of mobile peers. The model exhibits three interesting features not seen in previous works. Firstly, it considers voting for peers from the perspectives of both trust and distrust. This appears to be the first attempt to incorporate distrust in the polling algorithm. Secondly, it credits/penalizes a peer according to its interaction behaviors, the size of interaction and the vote accuracy. This mechanism of credit and penalization is expected to deter dishonesty or misbehavior by the entities involved. Thirdly, it effectively solves the trust problem when no prior interaction history exists, an issue that has not been addressed in many models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 3 presents the proposed trust model. Section 4 contains experimental study. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Trust-management approach for distributed systems security was first introduced in the context of Internet as an answer to the inadequacy of traditional cryptographic mechanisms. Some of the notable earlier works in this domain have been trust-management engines such as RT framework [10] . Since then many trust models based on reputation have been proposed for P2P networks, such as EigenTrust [2] , PowerTrust [3] , Bayesian network-based trust model [4] and so on. Yet, little has been done to show how trust and distrust can be incorporated into a trust model to yield an outcome that is beneficial to trust computation. In fact, even a small amount of information about distrust can tangibly help judge about a peer's trust. The proposed mechanism does borrow some design features from several existing works in literature but as a complete system differs from all the existing reputationbased systems.
EigenTrust [2] model is designed for the reputation management of P2P systems. The global reputation of peer i is marked by the local trust values assigned to peer i by other peers, which reflects the experience of other peers with it. The core of the model is that a special normalization process where the trust rating held by a peer is normalized to have their sum equal to 1. The shortcoming is that the normalization could cause the loss of important trust information. Runfang Zhou and Kai Hwang [3] proposed a power-law distribution in user feedbacks and a computational model, i.e., PowerTrust, to leverage the power-law feedback characteristics. The paper used a trust overlay network (TON) to model the trust relationships among peers. PowerTrust can greatly improve global reputation accuracy and aggregation speed, but it can not avoid the communication overhead in global trust computation.
A Bayesian network-based trust model [4] proposed by Wang and Vassileva uses reputation built on recommendations in P2P networks. The work differentiates between two types of trust, trust in the host's capability to provide the service and trust in the host's reliability in providing recommendations. A new trust model based on recommendation evidence is proposed for P2P Networks by Tian Chun Qi et al [5] . The proposed model has advantages in modeling dynamic trust relationship and aggregating recommendation information. It filters out noisy recommendation information. Though the trust model filters out noisy recommendation information, the algorithm is complex algorithm considering the complexity of the algorithm design and the workload in the system running.
Thomas Repantis and Vana Kalogeraki [6] propose a decentralized trust management middleware for ad-hoc, peer-to-peer systems, based on reputation. In the work, the middleware's protocols take advantage of the unstructured nature of the network to render malicious behavior, and the reputation information of each peer is stored in its neighbors and piggy-backed on its replies. The proposed approach allows peers to calculate a local trust for other peers with the reputation information which is collected by flooding reference trust requests to peers' friends. However, in large scale mobile P2P networks, flooding mechanism is not scalable.
Recently, there are many approaches studying trust management of wireless systems. The significant efforts done so far are to manage trust with the help of Certificate Authority (CA) or Key Distribution Center (KDC). A CA/KDC is responsible for setting up the foremost trust relationships among all the nodes by distributing keys or certificates [7] . Then, CA's functionality is substituted by t sub-CAs using threshold cryptography, and these t sub-CAs will issue partial certificates afterwards. In the solution, a group of n servers together with a master public/private key pair are firstly deployed by CA. Each server has a share of the master private key and stores the key pairs of all nodes. The shares of master private key are generated using threshold cryptography. Thus, only n servers together can form a whole signature. For any node wanting to join the network, it must first collect all of the n partial signatures. Then the node can compute the whole signature locally and thus get the certificate. However, this strategy suffers from difficulty on collecting t certificates efficiently.
In the distributed CA scheme [8] , Kong et al. mentioned that the trust between a to-be-member node and t member nodes in its neighborhood can be established by out-of-bound physical proofs, such as human perception or biometrics. However, we can find that this method is far from practical. It is obviously impossible for a node acquiring t nodes to trust it in its local communication range, because the trust evidence should be evaluated and authenticated, or there should exist off-line trust relationships between this node and the t member nodes. In an infrastructureless mobile network environment, the evaluation of trust evidence will be very hard.
A novel trust evaluation model to be proposed in this paper has addressed these weaknesses. Namely, the model has defined clear criteria for trust calculation. A mobile peer can select one or more peers to interact based upon the criteria such that the aggregated trust value of these selected peers satisfies the trust level specified by the mobile peer owner. The trust level is, in turn, determined by the value of the interaction to be performed. In addition, the mobile peer owner calculates and updates trust values associated with each of the peers involved in an interaction by Trust Updating algorithm.
III. THE TRUST METRICS
In the section we firstly present the definition and type of trust, then introduce seven trust factors which influence the trust in such a mobile environment.
A. The definition and type of trust
Trust plays a role across many disciplines, including sociology, psychology, economics, political science, history, philosophy, and computer science. As such, work in each discipline has attempted to define the concept. The problem with defining trust is that there are many different types of trust and it means something different to each person, and potentially in each context where it is applied. In order to facilitate making computations with trust in mobile P2P systems, we propose the following definition: trust in a peer is a commitment to an action based on a belief that the future actions of that peer will lead to a good outcome. This definition forms the foundation for identifying main factors that influence the trust in mobile P2P systems, and how it can be used in computation. Our trust model has two types of trust: direct trust and recommendation trust. Direct trust is the trust of a peer on another based on the direct interacting experience and is used to evaluate trustworthiness when a peer has enough interacting experience with another peer. On the other hand, recommendation trust is used when a peer has little interacting experience with another one. Recommendation trust is the trust of a peer on another one based on direct trust and other peers' recommendation.
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B. The trust factors
The mobile network environment is more distributed, with wider participants and more autonomic than the fixed P2P network. Since there is no centralized node to serve as an authority to monitor and punish the peers that behave badly, malicious peers have an incentive to provide poor quality services for their benefit because they can get away. An important question raised is how can a mobile peer owner decide one or more peers to interact with it? In other words, what should be the selection criteria on which the mobile peer owner makes the interaction decision. Obviously, the mobile peer owner should select the peers that have an acceptable level of trust. In our distributed trust model, a peer's trust is measured by a trust level. The value is the result of the peer's aggregated interactional behaviors (reflected by its responses) over a specific past period. The trust level reflects the truthfulness of the peer in performing the interactions.
The value is the function of the following parameters. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree in interactions: When a mobile peer finishes an interaction with another peer, the mobile peer will evaluate its behavior in the interaction. The result of evaluation is described using satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree which is in the range (-1, 1). Satisfaction and dissatisfaction degrees express how well and how poor this peer has performed in the interaction, respectively. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree can encourage interacting sides to behave well during interactions. However, it is sufficient to measure a peer's trustworthiness without taking into account the number of interactions.
Number of interactions performed: Some peers have a higher interaction frequency than some other peers due to a skewed interaction distribution. A peer will be more familiar with other peers by increasing the number of interactions. A simple aggregation of feedbacks may fail to capture the true record of a peer's interactional behavior. For example, a peer that has performed dozens of interactions but cheated on 1 out of every 4 occasions will have a higher aggregated trust value in comparison with a peer that has only performed 10 interactions and has been faithful in all of these occasions. In other words, the total number of interactions that the peer has performed over the specific past period is also an important indicator of its trust and should be taken into account for the calculation of its trust value. In our model, the average feedback value, measured as the ratio of the sum of the feedbacks the peer has received over time period T h to the total number of interactions the peer has taken part over the same period, is used instead of a simple sum.
Size of interactions: Size has different meanings in different P2P environments. In a P2P file sharing network, the size of interaction expresses the file size shared in each interaction, while in a P2P business community, it shows the sums of money involved in each interaction. We know that helping with an interaction with a value of $1000 certainly worth more credits than that with a value of $10. Similarly, failure to perform an interaction of £1000 should be penalized more than failing a $10 one. Size of interactions is an important factor that should be considered in the trust model. For peers without any interacting history, most previous trust models often define a default level of trust. But if it is set too low, it would make it more difficult for a peer to show trustworthiness through its actions. If it is set very high, there may be a need to limit the possibility for peers to "start over" by re-registration after misbehaving. In our trust model, the introduction of the size of interactions effectively solves the trust problem of peers without any interacting history. An example of Size of interactions is given in Table 2 .The details will be described in the next part.
Time: The influence of an interacting history record to trust always decays with time. The more recent interactions have more influence on trust evaluation of a peer. For instance, if peer X has interacted with peer Y for a long time, the change of trust degree influenced by the interaction three years earlier is weaker than that of today. In our trust model, we introduce time factor to reflect this decay, that is, the most recent interaction usually has the biggest time factor.
Vote accuracy:
We use a distributed polling algorithm [1] to collect peer's reputation information in our model. Vote accuracy factor reflects the accuracy that a peer votes for other peers. For example, if a peer correctly votes for other peers, it will have a high vote accuracy factor. The purpose of introducing this factor is to encourage peers to vote actively and correctly in our model. As if their suggestions are more worthy of belief, people are always honest in the real society.
Punishment function: The measurement of trust is the accumulation of the effects of interactions, both positive and negative. We not only consider the decay of influence of the interaction experiences with time, but also punish malicious actions. Punishment should be involved by decreasing its trust degree according to the amount of malicious behaviors. Therefore we introduce the punishment factor in our model to be used to fight against subtle malicious attacks. For instance, if a peer increases its trustworthiness through well-behaving in small-size interactions and tries to make a profit by misbehaving in large-size interactions, the peer would need more successful small-size interactions to offset the loss of its trust degree.
Risk: Every peer has its own security defense ability which is reflected by risk factor, such as the ability to detect vulnerabilities, the ability to address any viruses and to defend against intrusions.
IV. A DISTRIBUTED TRUST EVALUATION MODEL
To dynamically select a subset of trusted peers among a set of N peers, {trusted peer i , i ∈{1, ..., N}}, based upon their real-time interactional behavior to assist a mobile peer to perform security sensitive tasks, a distributed trust evaluation model is required. It includes two steps: trust computing and updating. A mobile peer can select one or more peer to interact if the aggregated trust value of these selected peers satisfies the trust level specified by the mobile peer owner. The mobile peer owner updates trust values associated with each of the peers involved in an interaction based upon the feedback received.
A. Assumptions
The Distributed Trust Evaluation Model is designed based upon the following assumptions: 
Size has different meanings in different P2P environments. In a P2P file sharing network, the size of interaction expresses the file size shared in each interaction, while in a P2P business community, it shows the sums of money involved in each interaction. We also assume that table TV is sorted in a descending order according to the satisfaction (Sat) values. Thus, the peer with the highest satisfaction value shall be in the first row of the table. The mobile peer may decide an upper-limit for the trust value according to his/her preferences. Tables TV is controlled by the validity periods t h , to maintain the freshness of the relevant data and to reduce memory and computational expenses. Trust evaluation model
B. Trust evaluation model
Consider the situation where mobile peer X wants to interact with peer Y in order to accomplish a certain task. Peer X won't interact unless it is sure that peer Y is trustworthy. In order to find out whether peer Y is trustworthy, peer X calculates a trust value for peer Y. There are two ways in which to calculate trust value: direct and recommendation. When peer X has enough interaction experience with peer Y, peer X uses direct trust to calculate the trust value for peer Y. On the other hand, when peer X doesn't have enough interaction experience with peer Y, peer X uses recommendation trust to calculate the trust value for peer Y. In our paper, an interaction experience threshold is predefines based on the size of interactions in a P2P network. For example, the threshold is lower when downloading a 1M confidential file than a 200M confidential file. If peer X's interaction experience with peer Y exceeds this predefined threshold, peer X chooses direct trust to calculate the trust value for peer Y, otherwise, it chooses recommendation trust. peer X chooses to join a group based on its interest. Then it checks its own group and location with GPS and floods a HELLO message, to announce itself to other peers by using Echo protocol [11] , then requests all other members of the group to cast a vote for peer Y from the perspective of trust and distrust in the level of Q . For any new peer without any interaction history, its trust value would be 0 and would be granted the lowest level of the size of interaction. Without voting, it will be permitted to interact at the lowest level. Second, after the other peers receive the poll request message, they will decide whether to cast the vote based on the following formula. Let E denotes a voting peer, The simulation environment is set up as follows: we create 300 peers that will perform interacting in a mobile p2p resource sharing system. 300 mobile peers are uniformly distributed at the area whose size is 500 500 m m × . Communicating range of a mobile device is 70m. The simulated experiments were run on a dualprocessor Dell server and the operation system installed on this machine is Linux with kernel 2.6.9. To make our simulation as close to the real mobile p2p systems where peers often go offline, we simulate the offline peers by assigning every peer a random lifetime (or Time-ToLive) within the step range [50, 100]. After reaching the lifetime, the peer will not respond to any service request, and won't be counted in the statistics either. After one more step, the peer comes alive again with a new life time randomly chosen from the range [50, 100] . In this analysis, we assume that all mobile peers have a same amount of battery power and participate in communication positively regardless of their roles. Each peer acts as both client and server to share its resources with other peers, and communicates with each other via IEEE 802.11. The default parameters in simulation experiments are showed in the table 3. 
A. Malicious recommendation
In the first experiment we evaluate the trust evaluation model in terms of its efficiency of excluding malicious recommendations in the network. We implement and simulate a file sharing system. In this analysis, we assume that all mobile peers have a same amount of battery power and participate in communication positively regardless of their roles. So, we consider only a consistency evaluation factor. Figure 1 shows the simulation result in which the broken line denotes the recommendation trust value Tm that includes malicious peers' recommendations and the solid line denotes the real recommendation trust value Tr that doesn't include any malicious recommendations. In this simulation, a same malicious recommendation event occurs every 10 seconds.
As we can see Figure 1 (a), normal recommendation trust value is 0.3, but a malicious recommendation result is 0.9 by few malicious peer which broadcasts three times as high as a normal recommendation result. This indicates the vulnerability of a system without a trust evaluation scheme. Figure 1 (b) shows the process of filtering inconsistent data of a malicious node which acts inconsistently after certain seconds with a proposed trust evaluation scheme. We can see that Tm fluctuates around Tr but the scale of the fluctuation is very small. The earlier the system detects a malicious node, the lower the malicious recommendations of it can affect the aggregated result. 
B. Cheating in the accumulation of trust
In our trust model direct trust has the property of rising slowly and dropping fast. The introduction of level of size of interaction limits interactions to certain levels. Consequently, attack is prevented when malicious peers cheat in large interactions through improving trust value using many small interactions. Our second experiment verifies the effectiveness of the proposed model by simulating the relationship between the direct trust and the interaction number of malicious peers. In the experiment, we firstly conducted 100 interactions. If there is no fraud, the direct trust value is 0.9 as shown in Figure  2 . We can see when the peer has a behavior of fraud in the 105th interaction, its direct trust value would drop to 0.85. The peer has 35 small interactions from the 105th interaction to 140th interaction, but there is a difference between the current direct trust value and the previous 105th one. In the 140th interaction, the peer has another malicious behavior resulting in its direct trust value dropping faster. When it has one more cheating behavior, its trust value continues rapid dropping. All together, though the peer has successfully conducted 60 small-size interactions, the direct trust value could not recover the original trust value. The main reason is that after one malicious behavior, a peer needs to successfully conduct many more honest interactions to make up for the loss of trust value. If it conducts small-size interactions, it needs to have more interactions to offset the loss of its trust degree.
C. Group Cheat
In the third experiment, we assess the performance of our mechanism under two attack models: independent cheat and group cheat. Our experiment also points out that the trust model is also sensitive to the group cheat. In the experiment, we add a number of malicious peers to the network such that malicious peers make up between 0% and 70% of all peers in the network. Figure 3 shows what is happening. In this figure, we compare the independent cheap and group cheat. Under independent cheat, the malicious peers firstly accumulate trust values through small interactions, gaining a relatively high trust. After trusted by most adjacent peers, the peer takes advantage of its high trust value to attack another peer, which means to always provide an inauthentic file to another peer when selected as download source.
Group cheat is that there is a group in which the peer of the group provides an authentic file to each other and provides an inauthentic file to the peer outside the group. The rate of inauthentic downloads under independent cheat or group cheat increases at the beginning, then starts to drop when the number of malicious peers reaches to 30%-40% of all peers in the network. The reason is that the trust computing mechanism used in our experiments punishes this behavior by lower the trust values quickly. Since malicious peers found by the mechanism will lose choice selected as download sources. As a result, the rate of inauthentic downloads will drop. However, due to the good rating coming from the cheating group, the rate of inauthentic downloads under group cheat drops more slowly than the one under independent peer. Yet one thing remains assured: the rate under group cheat is still dropping and will drop to 5%. Even if no malicious peers are present in the system, downloads are evaluated as inauthentic in 3%-5% of all cases -this accounts for mistakes users make when creating and sharing a file, e.g., by providing the wrong meta-data or creating and sharing an unreadable file. 
D. The trust problem for a new peer
For peers without any interacting history, most previous trust models often define a default level of trust. The problem is that if this level is set too low, it may be difficult for the new peer to prove its trustworthiness through actions. If this level is set too high, there may be a need to limit the possibility that peers would have to "start over" by re-registration after misbehaving. In our trust, the introduction of the size of interaction effectively solves the trust problem of peers without any interacting history.
We assume that peer X is a new peer which has no interaction experience with other peers. If it wants to interact with peer Y, in our trust model, its trust value is 0 and it would be granted the lowest level of size of interaction. Without any voting, peer X would be immediately permitted to interact at the lowest level. Therefore our trust effectively solves the trust problem for a new peer. As the new peer is granted the lowest level of size of interaction, it is prohibited from cheating in larger size interactions by giving interaction chances.
E. The influence of the time factor
The experiment shows that our proposed model can truly reflect the influence of interaction history to trust which always decays with time, as shown in Figure 4 . Many previous trust models failed to consider the decay influence, so the calculation of trust values is not very accurate. As the result, trust values are usually computed higher than the real ones in those trust models. Our proposed model can well solve this problem. The realization of trust mechanism in mobile p2p systems is quite different due to some characteristics of mobile environment, which indicates the trust between participants can not be set up simply on the traditional trust mechanism. In the paper we proposed a novel trust evaluation model for mobile P2P systems. The main factors that influence the trust in mobile P2P systems are identified. Our model does not employ cryptographic approaches or certification mechanisms, so it is light enough to fit well with mobile P2P systems without great overheads. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is one of the incipient researches on trust evaluation model for mobile P2P systems that can detect malicious and compromised mobile peers. In addition, the proposed model effectively solves the trust problem of peers without any interacting history. We expect that our trust evaluation model can help to make resilient mobile P2P systems. In the near future, we would like to test our trust into more real mobile p2p systems and analyze the system performances. 
